PHILOS 225 - Probability and Inductive Logic: Defeasible Inference
Lecture: Lec 1
Class ID: 712222200
Class Website: https://ccle.ucla.edu/course/view/19S-PHILOS225-1
Open: 8 of 15 Left
0 of 5 Taken
Dodd Hall Room 325
Final Exam Information
Consult instructor for method of evaluation
Lecture, three hours. Topics may include interpretations of probability, Bayesian and non-Bayesian confirmation theory, paradoxes of confirmation, coherence, and conditioning. S/U or letter grading.
Most traditional systems of inference are monotonic: adding more information to premise set cannot modify evidentiary connection between premise and conclusion. Obviously, many inferences we care about are non-monotonic or defeasible. Survey of philosophy of defeasible inference. Study looks at various sources of defeasible inference, such as Chisholm's paradox in ethics, Pollock's undercutting versus rebutting distinction in epistemology, and AGM-styles of belief revision in philosophy of science. Review of default logic basics, logic programming, and probabilistic logics: three formalisms most commonly used today. Study looks at how three contemporary philosophers develop and apply these ideas. In particular, reading of selections from Horty's Reasons as Defaults; van Lambalgen's coauthored books Human Reasoning and Cognitive Science, and The Proper Treatment of Events; and Leitgeb's The Stability of Belief.
General Education (GE)
This class does not satisfy any GE requirements.
This class does not satisfy any College/School diversity requirement.
Materials Use Fee